This paper uses individual loan data for a national lender to estimate loan price elasticities across loan products and racial groups. The data contain detail on closing dates and prices, enabling control for market volatility and construction of pseudo-prices for foregone products. The empirical model is a mixed multinomial and conditional logit which is rooted in a structural utility framework. Asymptotic standard errors for the elasticity estimates are generated with the bootstrap and allow the inference that minorities are nearly perfectly insensitive to price, whereas whites are highly sensitive to price. The racial differences in price elasticities may indicate pre-application discrimination and provide incentive for rational (price) discrimination. They also suggest that empirical assessment of discrimination must confront non-random sorting of borrowers across products to avoid biased estimates of discrimination.
Introduction
For many years, policy makers have been concerned about racial discrimination by lenders in mortgage markets. Since the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 (HMDA) lenders have been required to report loan application data which have been used by regulatory agencies and class action litigants to argue that lenders discriminate in loan approval. This article argues that the empirical methods deployed in this debate must be extended because they omit important elements of the demand side of the market, including consumer choice among differentiated loan products. In this paper, I estimate loan price elasticities across products and ethnicities to illuminate the discriminatory mechanism and to fill a methodological gap in the existing literature.
The literature focuses on discrimination in approval or denial of loans. Lenders may also discriminate in the pricing of loans: minorities may pay a premium in interest or points. Before one can attempt to measure discrimination in mortgage markets, it is necessary to examine the demand for loans and the selection processes that occur before loan approval and pricing decisions occur. A borrower who shops for a loan must first decide on a lender. Then, conditional on having chosen a lender, the borrower must decide on a product.
Failure to consider these selection processes confounds findings of discrimination with self-selection. Estimates from the standard logistic models are only conditional estimates; that is, they are conditional on the borrower's choice of lender and product. If minorities choose different products, then models that do not incorporate borrower behavior will bias estimates of discrimination. For example, minorities may borrow from more expensive lenders, select more expensive loan products, or be less sensitive to price (their demand may be less price elastic). A finding of different price elasticities across races does not preclude the presence of discrimination. Minorities may have more price inelastic demand because underwriters steer them toward more expensive products or because they have higher search costs. 1 Even if minorities are less sensitive to price because they have higher search costs that are exogenous to lenders, these elasticities may lead to (rational) price discrimination by lenders. Estimates of ethnically distinct loan product choice elasticities will not only serve to amplify the current empirical literature, but they will also provide insight into the discriminatory mechanism at work.
In this paper, I estimate price elasticities across races and loan products. The empirical framework consists of a mixed conditional and multinomial logit model of mortgage product choice. The mixed logit framework is consistent with a structural model of utility, and the probabilties associated with a mortgage product type correspond to the demand for that product. In my specification, I include interactions of the minority and price variables to allow for different elasticities. Parameters from the logit estimation are then used to construct elasticities for minorities as a whole, blacks, Hispanics, and whites. I find that whites are far more sensitive to price than minorities for all loan product types. At the very least, this suggests the need to account for selection in loan product choice when measuring discrimination in the mortgage loan market.
In section 2, I present the conceptual framework for the empirical model, and I discuss the mortgage discrimination literature. In section 3, I present the data, model, and results, and in section 4, I conclude.
The Conceptual Framework and Previous Work
Estimation of loan product elasticities across races is motivated by both theoretical and empirical concerns. Conceptually, knowledge of relative price sensitivity across groups provides insight into the incentives for discrimination. Empirically, differentiated elasticity estimates will expose bias in existing measures of discrimination and will provide an additional empirical step to be incorporated in future attempts to quantify discrimination. I posit a conceptual framework in which product choice elasticities vary with ethnicity and are consistent with different patterns of discrimination. The framework underscores our motivation in obtaining the elasticity estimates.
Mortgages are differentiated products that vary according to term, price, and risk. On the demand side, borrowers are heterogeneous agents with different tastes for loan products. In particular, preferences over loan products may vary systematically across ethnicities, resulting in different elasticities. These differentiated elasticities may reflect structural differences in utility, pre-application discrimination, or may provide incentive for rational discrimination.
First, the differences in preferences may be a product of differences in ability to re-pay loans and expectations about tenure in a new home. For example, borrowers who are mobile and anticipate a short stay in a new home might prefer an adjustable rate mortgage because they would derive larger benefits from initially low "teaser" rates. To the extent that borrower risk profiles differ across ethnicities, their preferences for different loan products, and, consequently, their price elasticities will differ. In this case, different elasticities could result from structural differences in utility, rather than lender discrimination.
Racially differentiated preferences may result from lender pressure or discrimination in other markets. Differential price sensitivities and preferences for loan products may be induced by lender steering if lenders encourage certain groups to choose more expensive loans, a form of pre-application discrimination. Alternatively, if consumers engage in search when they participate in the mortgage market, then different price elasticities could reflect different search costs. 2 Consumers search for loans along geographical, product, and institutional dimensions. The incentive for consumer search is based on a distribution of interest rates, where the distribution arises endogenously from lender market power. Search costs vary across heterogeneous consumers, for example according to income, educational attainment, and geographic location. In the lending context, search costs consist primarily of nonrefundable application fees and the value of timetime spent filling out applications and evaluating complex offers. If search costs differ sysytematically across ethnicities, then they will lead to ethnically distinct preferences and price sensitivities.
If lenders engage in racial steering or if discrimination in other markets imposes greater loan search costs on minorities, racially distinct elasticities will reflect discrimination, rather than structural differences in utility. While racially distinct elasticities could be used subsequently by lenders to discriminate in loan approval decisions, the differences in elasticities may themselves be the result of discrimination. Clearly, identification of elasticities for different ethnic groups is of interest in identifying the source and the presence of discrimination.
The supply side of the lending market confers additional motivation for estimating racially distinct elasticities. Lenders have market power if products are differentiated or if informational asymmetries are present. The inability of borrowers to match idiosyncratic interest rate offers to lenders without investing time and money confers lender market power. If lenders see ethnically distinct price elasticities and product preferences, they may engage in cost or revenue based price discrimination. If borrowers from different ethnic groups have systematically different default probabilities, resulting in different costs to lenders, lenders will charge riskier (costlier) borrowers higher prices. If lenders incur equivalent costs from borrowers of different ethnic groups a finding of racially differentiated elasticities would expose incentives for lenders to engage in price discrimination, even if they have not engaged in discrimination in earlier stages of the loan application process.
The many opportunities for discrimination in the mortgage loan process underscore the need to consider borrower product choice in assessing discrimination in loan approval and pricing decisions. Empirical work which ignores borrower product selection will result in biased estimates of discrimination. Bias arises from omission of borrower product choice because both observable and unobservable borrower characteristics will be correlated with aspects of loan approval and pricing decisions that are observable to the lender, but not to the econometrician. For example, the same borrower risk and price preferences that motivate loan product choice may be observed by lenders, who make their approval and pricing decisions conditional on these characteristics. To the extent that borrower sorting is correlated with race, an omitted variable problem ensues in which the race coefficients absorb non-random variation in borrower product choice.
Nearly all of the literature on loan discrimination uses a logistic regression model in which an indicator for loan approval rates is regressed on borrower attributes. The best known of these, Munnell, et al. (1995) , generated the surge in regulatory interest in fair lending issues. These authors set out to resolve the debate over whether the racial differences in average loan approval rates that are apparent in the HMDA data is proof of discrimination, or whether variables absent from the HMDA data explain observed disparaties, reducing the significance and magnitude of the coefficient on race. Using both least squares and logit specifications the authors find that, all else equal, minorities face higher loan rejection rates.
Munnell, et al., is the first large scale attempt to control for credit risk factors that are likely to affect the probability of default. However, the authors did not control for borrower sorting across loan products. In particular, if minorities are exogenously riskier borrowers with lower price sensitivity, the race coefficient will overestimate discrimination. If minorities are steered toward more expensive loans or have higher search costs, the race coefficient will underestimate discrimination.
Another important paper is Crawford and Rosenblatt (1995) which seeks to detect discrimination loan pricing. The authors estimate separate models for samples containing conventional and government-backed loans. They use least squares to regress calculated premia (relative to the "market" rate) on borrower and loan characteristics as well as race indicators, and find no evidence of discrimination in conventional loan rates, but small, significant minority price premia in government rates.
Here, the restriction of the sample to thirty year FRMs and government loans leads to a selection problem. Before trying to quantify minority price premia, one must account for borrower product selection from a menu of loan products and prices. Failure to account for nonrandom sorting of borrowers across loan types will lead to biased estimates. For example, if minorities systematically choose loan products with higher prices, a model of loan pricing which omits consideration of borrower product choice will result in an upwardly biased coefficient on the race indicator; the race indicator will pick up all of the variation in borrower product selection.
Finally, Phillips, Robert, and Yezer (1996) discuss self-selection problems in estimating of denial rates and default rates. Self-selection results because loan approval data are available only for potential borrowers who have completed applications for a given loan type, and loan default data are available only for applicants who have been approved and originated loans. The authors contribute by considering the demand-side of the observed loan approval equilibria.
The authors estimate conditional and unconditional denial equations using the Boston Fed data of 1990. The authors estimate a mortgage product choice equation in which the products are conventional and government loans, and choice is dependent on income, house price, and attributes of property location. They jointly estimate this equation with a loan denial equation allowing for correlation between error terms. The authors expect the correlation between selection of conventional loans and loan rejection errors to be negative; individuals who are poorer risks will select or be steered toward non-conventional products, so that errors which lead to a higher probability of choosing a conventional loan at the first stage will lead to a lower probability of denial in the second stage.
The estimated error correlation from this model was negative, but insignificant. The failure to detect a significant error correlation may be the result of the limited range of product choice that was captured in the model. Other demand-side choices, ranging from choice of a lending institution to choice of loan characteristics (e.g., ARM vs. FRM), also should be taken into account. For example, in choosing among products with different prices and terms borrowers exhibit different risk preferences, which lead to heterogeneous elasticities and may affect approval pricing decisions.
My data do not permit estimation of both the product choice and loan approval models because I lack information on denied loans. In a complete structural model, equations reflecting lenders' co-determination of interest rates and points, consumer selection of products, and the loan approval decision would be estimated jointly, allowing correlation between the three errors. I am unable to estimate the complete model here, in part due to missing variables (e.g.,loan approval indicator), and in part because the three equations together would be unidentified: lenders rely on the same set of observable and unobservable borrower characteristics when they determine the trade-off between rates and points as when they make their approval decisions. Additionally, this set of borrower characteristics motivates borrowers in their choice of products. The same set of variables would enter each equation preventing identification in the joint model. Given these data and identification constraints, I focus on borrower product choice.
I contribute to the literature by estimating racially differentiated loan price elasticities, a step which should be incorporated in all future empirical efforts. Estimating a product choice model to observe price elasticities for different ethnic groups will be of interest not only to underscore potential bias in previous work, but to provide insight into the source of discrimination. Statistically indistinguishable elasticities for whites and minorities would rule out price discrimination as the discriminatory mechanism. A lower price sensitivity for minorities does not support a particular theory of discrimination, but it suggests a number of different discrimination mechanisms, ranging from steering to revenue or cost based price discrimination. My estimates indicate that there is a substantial difference in demand for loans across minorities and whites.
Empirical Model
This section specifies demand equations for loans to assess whether minority and white applicants have different price elasticities. I specify a model of loan product choice, using individual data on loan products, individual characteristics, and prices.
In sections 3.1 and 3.2 I describe the data and the covariates used in the demand equations. In section 3.3, I describe the demand model and I highlight spcification issues. Finally, in section 3.4 I provide results. 
Data
The data represent the active portfolio of a single lender, City Federal Savings Bank (CFSB) of New Jersey from 12/22/87 to 11/28/89. 3 CFSB is a National lender, that has made loans in 44 states. The data are rich in detail about loan terms and prices, as well as borrowers characteristics. The original data consist of 20,034 observations, where the unit of observation is an approved loan. These observations span 71 product types. I work with a subsample of loans in the following product categories: 30 year fixed rate mortgages (FRMs), 15 year fixed rate mortgages, 30 year (with one year rate adjustment period) adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), and 30 year fixed rate Government (FHA and VA) loans. Table 1 provides counts of the number of loans in each category.
These products comprise the majority of loans and are readily identifiable in the data. Additionally, they allow me to examine consumer choice between adjustable and fixed rate mortgages, as well as conventional and government loans. I further screened the data to exclude loans with missing entries on race, interest rates, front end ratio, or monthly principal and interest payments. The working dataset consists of 14,938 observations. Table  2 contains definitions of variables that are included in the analysis.
Tables 3 -6 provide descriptive statistics on important variables. Table  3 provides descriptive statistics for the entire sample, while tables 4 -6 provide descriptive statistics by product type and by race.
As is apparent in Table 3 , the dispersion in the price variables (interest rate and points) is substantial. As shown in Tables 4 -6 Hispanics have the highest average interest rate, followed by blacks. Similarly, blacks and Hispanics pay slightly higher total points than do whites. Tables 7 -9 give the frequency with which members of a race choose The sum of origination points and discount points, in percent each loan type. These tables show that minorities are more likely to choose government loans and less likely to select ARMs. These descriptive statistics do not control for market or individual characteristics that may influence rates, but they do motivate further analysis of the source of differences between racial groups in product choice. The questions for analysis are whether minority borrowers self-select into more expensive loan types and are less sensitive to price, providing a motive for lenders to discriminate according to an inverse elasticity rule.
Covariates
In this section I describe the covariates that will be used in the product choice (demand) model.
An important advantage of this dataset is that it contains detailed data on closing dates, enabling control of market volatility on a temporal dimension. The closing dates are important in constructing "pseudo prices" where prices are unobserved (see below).
Studies by Alm and Follain (1987) Brueckner and Follaine (1988) , Brueckner and Follain (1988) , and Sa-aadu and Sirmans (1995) suggest that a borrower's risk aversion, discount rate for future consumption, mobility, and "strength" of demand for housing will affect the FRM-ARM choice. In general, the variables that affect the choice of mortgage type may be classified as borrower characteristics, market conditions, and price variables. Borrower characteristics include AGE, INCOME, RENTER, EDUCA-TION, REFINANCE, SECMORTGAGE, and demographic indicators (see Table 2 ). Age may proxy for a number of effects. One expects that mobility decreases with age, so that age would negatively impact the likelihood of choosing a shorter contract. Age may also proxy for life-cycle or expected earnings effects. Borrowers expecting rising incomes are more likely to be ARMs borrowers because they will be better situated to bear interest rate risk. So AGE will also negatively impact the likelihood of choosing an ARMs contract. INCOME also proxies for mobility and life-cycle or expected earnings effects. Borrowers with high income would be better situated to bear interest risk, and, consequently, would be more likely to choose ARMs contracts.
RENTER also proxies for mobility. Households who currently rent their homes are more mobile, so we expect a positive impact of RENTER on the likelihood of choosing an ARMs loan.
A well-educated borrower is likely to be better informed about loan products, and so to have lower search costs. Consequently, EDUCATION is likely to be positively correlated with the choice of an ARM.
A number of other borrower characteristics are likely to affect the mortgage product choice. These include FIRSTIME, REFINANCE, and SEC-MORTGAGE. Here there are no strong a priori expectations.
The other crucial class of borrower characteristics is a series of race indicators. Alternative specifications include BLACK, HISPANIC, and MI-NORITY. Based on the tables in section 3.1, we expect that minorities will be more willing to accept the more expensive (FRM and government) loans.
The geographic and temporal market climate also can impact borrower choice. This paper does not control for market climate. I leave to future work inclusion of state fixed effects to control for geographic variation.
Finally, the remaining important covariates in the demand equations are the price variables. Here the econometrician faces an important missing information problem: only the price of the selected product is observable. This requires recursive construction of the prices of the forgone loan products for each observation. When actual prices are unobservable, "pseudo prices" can be constructed in several ways. One approach is to use the lender's average rate for each product type on each closing date to fill in the unobserved prices. This approach may create a selection problem, however, in that the selected rate is likely to have been a better deal, all else equal, than the foregone, unobserved rates. Another approach would be to regress rates for each loan type on data such as the Federal Home Loan Bank Board rates on actual fixed or adjustable rate loans and to use the estimated coefficients and FHLBB rates to estimate the pseudo prices. Another approach, taken by Brueckner and Follain (1988) , which controls for selection in estimated prices is to use Heckman's two step procedure.
Given the paucity of data for each closing date, I construct three separate series of pseudo-prices. First I use lender data to construct monthly average prices for each product type. Monthly averages were necessary because the data are insufficient to support averages over a shorter period. At this level of aggregation, market volatility is unlikely to pose a problem. Thus, the first set of pseudo-prices is a series of prices for each product which consists of the actual price where available (on chosen products), and monthly average prices by product where actual prices are unavailable. The problem with this constructed data series is that in some months the lender did not originate fifteen year FRMs or thirty year ARMS: August, 1987 through February 1988 , and February 1990 through June, 1990 , resulting in missing price observations for all loans closed in these months. In this first set of pseudoprices, I do not attempt to fill in these missing observations. Rather, I restrict the sample, dropping these observations from estimation and using the remaining 14,603 observatons. Despite the loss of 334 degrees of freedom, I favor these pseudo-prices because they employ actual bank data and the overall abundance of degrees of freedom makes the omission negligible from a statistical perspective.
Alternatively, I use monthly national average data from the Monthly Interest Rate Survey of the Federal Housing Finance Board to make use of the full sample of loans. However, these pseudo-prices derive measurement error because the data are not bank-specific and the fixed rate averages are not disaggregated by term of loan.
Finally, I construct pseudo-prices that consist of bank monthly average prices supplemented with national monthly average prices for the missing observations. But this, too, introduces measurement error through the use of national average data.
Loans have two types of prices: the interest rate, and points. Points are paid upon origination of the loan. They include the origination fee and any discount points, which the borrower pays to "buy down" the interest rate. Rather than impose a restriction across rates and points, I include these variables separately in the regressions. When I compute price elasticities, I examine elasticities with respect to rates and points separately.
Once suitable estimates of unobserved prices are constructed, we may consider the specification of prices. If price elasticities are constant, the appropriate specification is the natural log of prices. If elasticities vary with prices (so that, for example, more extreme prices lead to more extreme elasticities), a linear specification may be appropriate. In the multinomial logit, a specification that is linear in prices has the unfortunate consequence that own-price elasticities are nearly proportional to own price; high prices mean more elastic demands, and, conversely, highly elastic demand is associated with higher markups. These elasticity patterns are in direct conflict with a theory of price discrimination when marginal cost is constant and identical across consumers. I estimate the linear in price specification. 4 Additionally, to capture differences in elasticties across races, I interact race indicators with prices. I separately interact the minority indicator, the black indicator, and the Hispanic indicator with prices to estimate distinct elasticities for whites, minorities, blacks, and Hispanics.
Model: Demand Specification
The demand for loan products may be conceptualized as a differentiated products discrete choice model. Accordingly, I choose a mixed logit model which is partly multinomial and partly conditional. McFadden (1974) shows that the multinomial logit is consistent with a structural model of expected utility maximization, where the random component follows a Type I extreme value distribution. The general set-up is:
Let Y j * denote the latent level of indirect utility associated with the j th choice. We observe Y j where
The specification for indirect utility is then
Where X j is a vector of observable characteristics of the j th choice and j captures unobserved variations in tastes and characteristics and are independently and identically distributed according to F ( j < ) = exp(−e − ).
In the mixed (conditional and multinomial) logit framework, the demand for a loan product is the probability that it is chosen, which is specified as
Here, i indexes individuals, and j indexes alternatives. Some of the covariates will vary across both individuals and alternatives. In the current context, these covariates include prices; the price data consist of a vector of prices for the different product types for each observation. When regressors vary across both individual and choice dimensions, choice-specific coefficients are unidentified, hence the lack of subscript on β. In contrast, other covariates vary only across individuals. Here choice specific coefficients are identified, hence the j subscript on α. A normalization is required for identification. I normalize by setting α j equal to zero for the choice of fifteen year FRMs. The interpretation of the other choice varying coefficients is then that α j is related to the impact of w i on the likelihood of choosing j over the fifteen year FRM. The multinonomial logit has the widely promulgated disadvantage of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property in which the relative frequency with which alternative k is chosen over alternative j is independent of other goods. For example, this implies that an increase in price of 15 year FRMs does not impact the relative odds of choosing a thirty year FRM over an ARM. Additionally, this is a restriction on cross price elasticities which will be the same for all products:
where x j denotes the price of the j th alternative. Intuitively this presents a problem: if the price of 15 year FRMs increases, we expect a different cross-elasticity with 30 year FRMs than with ARMs. For the purposes of this paper, we are most interested in own-price elasticities across loan products and racial groups; I leave relaxing the IIA constraint to future work.
Model: Estimation and Results
I estimate separate mixed logit models for different categories of "protected classes:" minority, black, and Hispanic. In each model, the conditional variables, x ij , are prices (points and rates for each choice) and race price interactions (points and rates interacted with the protected class indicator for each choice). The multinomial variables, w i , for each model include choice indicators (to allow for different constants across choice equations), AGE, RENTER, EDUCATION, INCOME, an indicator for the protected class, REFIN, FIRSTIME, and SEC-MORT. The coefficients on the multinomial variables are set to zero for fifteen year FRMs. I estimate each protected class mixed logit for each of the three pseudo-prices series which I have constructed. In tables 10 -12 , I report estimates for the specifications which use the first set of pseudo-prices for each of the three types of protected classes. To assess the overall goodness of fit, I also compute a statistic that is analogous to a pseudo R-square, which is distributed as Chi-square. The statistic is the likelihood ratio test statistic where the restricted model is a mixed logit with only a constant as a regressor. This measure assesses the joint explanatory power of the included covariates.
In the mixed logit, the dependent variable is a nonlinear function of the regressors so that the coefficients are meaningful only in providing a sense of the direction of the impact of the regressors on the probabilities. The measure of greatest interest is the partial derivative of the choice probability with respect to each regressor. This derivative will be the coefficient multiplied by the density evaluated at the parameter estimates and the observations. I provide estimates of the partial derivatives of the choice probabilities with respect to the regressors, evaluated at the sample means in Tables 13 -15 . Finally, I use the logit estimates and the data to construct own and cross price elasticities for the differentiated products and races. These elasticities are highly nonlinear functions of many estimated coefficients, so I obtain asymptotic standard errors using the Bootstrap, following Efron (1982) .
In the mixed logit for the minority protected class (and using lender average monthly prices as pseudo-prices) nearly all coefficients are significant at the .99 level, and most signs are in the expected direction. Likewise, the probability derrivatives are generally of the expected sign and of reasonable magnitude. The coefficients on rates and points are both negative and significant which is consistent with downward-sloping demand. The interactive variables are positive though the interactive points variable is only significant at the .88 level. This suggests that relative to whites, minorities are less price sensitive and are more likely to pay a price premium.
The other parameter estimates are interpreted as the impact of a regressor on the likelihood of choosing a thirty year FRM, thirty year ARM, or government loan over a fifteen year FRM. As above, most of these coefficients have the expected sign and are statistically significant. The parameter of greatest interest is the coefficient on minority status. Note that the coefficients indicate that, ceteris paribus, minorities are less likely than whites to select a 30-year fixed rate mortgage and more likely to select a government loan and an adjustable rate mortgage. The first and last results are surprising. As shown in Table 3 , minorities tend to be more likely to pick 30-year FRMs and less likely to pick ARMs, but the regression shows that the direction of these differences is caused by other borrower characteristics.
When the protected class is disaggregated into black or Hispanic, all of the signs remain the same except for the sign on BLACK for 30-year FRM, which is positive but insignificant. In each case, the Chi-square statistics suggest overall significance of the mixed logit specifications.
Finally, we desire estimates of price elasticities across races and product types. In the McFadden utility maximization framework, the models to be estimated represent indirect utility functions. Applying Roy's identity (and ignoring the fact that we cannot find the marginal utility of income), the demand for a product is the probability that it is chosen. Hence we may compute price elasticities. In the linear case, the own price (rates and points) elasticities for minorities and whites are:
where η jj denotes the own price elasticity of choosing j with respect to price j, m denotes minority, w denotes white, r denotes interest rates, p denotes points, and j indexes the product choice. Similarly, we may compute cross price elasticities. As a consequence of the IIA property of the mixed logit specification, the cross price elasticity of all goods with respect to price j will be equal. The cross price elasticities for minorities and whites are:
∀k, l, j η m kj (rates) = −(β rate r j + β m rate rm j )(P r(j)) η kj (rates) = −(β rate r j )(P r(j)) η m kj (points) = −(β points p j + β m points pm j )(P r(j)) η kj (points) = −(β points p j )(P r(j))
These elasticities are computed using the parameter estimates from the mixed logit estimation.
In computing average elasticity estimates, one can either compute the elasticties at the means, or the mean of the elasticities. If the elasticty is computed at the data means, the estimate may be interpreted as the elasticity of the representative agent. If the elasticities are computed for each observation and are then averaged, the estimate may be interpreted as the elasticity facing the lender. I prefer the latter method; there is no representative agent, but there is an average elasticity. Accordingly, I compute the elasticities for each sample point, and I then compute averages for minorities, blacks, Hispanics, and whites. Table 16 contains estimates of own price elasticities and Table 17 contains the estimates of cross price elasticities.
The estimates for own price elasticities for interest rates indicate that minorities, blacks, and Hispanics are all substantially less price elastic for all product types. Elasticities among whites range from six to nine, whereas the magnitude of the black elasticities ranges from .1 to .4. In fact, minority, black, and Hispanic own price elasticities for all products are statistically indistinguishable from zero at the .01 level; that is, we cannot reject the hypothesis of perfectly inelastic demand for these groups. The elasticity estimates for whites are all significant at the .01 level. Minorities, blacks, and Hispanics are most elastic in their demand for fifteen year FRMs, and least elastic in their demand for government loans. This makes sense because any individual who qualifies for a government loan would be expected to choose it.
The estimates for own price elasticities for points follow a similar patten. The estimates for blacks and Hispanics are positive, which is inconsistent with demand theory. However they are statistically insignificant, indicating inelastic demand. Whites have negative elasticities, which are small in magnitude. In general, the estimates indicate that borrowers are more sensitive to increases in interest rates than to increases in points.
It is logical that we see the most striking differences across groups in the rates elasticity estimates. Differences in points will occur primarily when borrowers try to "buy down" rates. These reflect a tradeoff between rates and points which should hold across all product types and races, rather than a fundamental difference in preferences across product types or races.
For minorities, blacks, and Hispanics, the cross price elasticities indicate a similar tenacity with respect to product choice: the cross price elasticities for rates and points are positive or negative, but small in magnitude and statistically indistinguishable from zero. For example, in Table 17for blacks, the elasticity of any product with respect to the FRM-15 rate is .008. This implies that an increase in the FRM-15 rate of one percent leads to a .008 percent increase in the likelihood of blacks choosing a FRM-30, ARM-30, or government loan.
For whites, cross price elasticities of all products with respect to FRM-30 rates and government rates are highly elastic, while all other cross price elasticity estimates are positive and close to (but statistically different from) zero. This suggests that an increase in the FRM-30 rates leads white borrowers to seek alternative loan products, and that an increase in the government rate leads white borrowers to choose a conventional loan.
These results should be taken with caution: the price elasticities estimated are not unconditional. A number of sample selection issues still remain. The data consist of approved loans for a single lender. Unconditional price elasticity estimates for loan applications to this lender would require data and imputed prices associated with rejected loan applications. Furthermore, even if unconditional estimates were available for this lender, I would still be unable to control for selection of lender.
Another problem which underlies the estimates is the treatment of expectations in constructing ARM prices. ARM loans are typically associated with low initial "teaser" interest rates. These interest rates then move according to a standard index after a prescribed rate adjustment period, with the increase in rates bounded by a ceiling. The available price data for ARMs includes the intial "teaser" rates. These rates do not capture expectations about rates over the course of the loan; they may introduce measurement error in the regressors. A better price variable might be principal and interest payments based on forecasted rates over the course of the loan. These could be constructed if the data generating process for interest rates was known or could be estimated.
Having noted these caveats, as conditional estimates, the elasticities indicate striking systematic patterns across different racial groups. As a consequence, race coefficients in traditional logit discrimination models (which do not incorporate borrower choice) will absorb the variation due to sorting, resulting in biased measurement of discrimination.
Conclusion
At a structural level, the elasticity estimates in this paper suggest that there are important differences between minorities and whites in the mortgage market. Minorities have significantly less price elastic demand than whites. The differences in elasticities could reflect race-based steering on the part of lenders or higher search costs of minorities. They could also reflect discrimination in other markets which spills over into credit markets. Finally, they provide lenders with an incentive to discriminate rationally according to a Ramsey pricing scheme.
There are a number of promising areas for further research. From a methodological perspective, the model may be improved by allowing random coefficients and relaxing the IIA property of the multinomial logit. This will allow for different cross-price elaticities across products, so that, for example, the cross-price elasticity of a thirty year FRM and a fifteen year FRM will differ from the cross-price elasticity of an ARM and a fifteen year FRM. Likewise, a more complete structural model that incorporates the codetermination of interest rates and points, the approval decision, and the borrower's choice of lender would provide more accurate estimates of price elasticities, as well as more closeley identify the source of discrimination if it is present.
Additionally, much work remains to be done on use of these elasticity estimates to quantitatively assess discrimination. One approach would be to estimate the period-by-period supply side of the model. In particular, in a theory of rational discrimination, lenders would be expected to use differences in elasticities to charge different mark-ups over marginal cost. The elasticity estimates in this paper, along with instruments for the internal cost of funds to the lender could be used to estimate the periodic markup of price over cost, to observe whether lenders price discriminate.
The debate over whether there is discrimination in credit market remains open. This paper contributes the insight that there are behavioral differences across borrowers of different races in mortgage markets where there are many opportunities for discrimination. For both conceptual and empirical reasons, the different elasticities as well as the borrower choice patterns which they represent cannot be ignored and must be integrated into any empirical assessment of discrimination in mortgage lending.
